The Preliminaries.

After attempting unsuccessfully to outmanoeuvre the Russians between the Alle and Vistula Rivers in late January 1807, Napoleon’s advanced units finally came up with Benningsen’s lumbering columns at Bergfried on the 3^rd February. However, the French were in insufficient numbers to mount a serious attack that day, and the Russians once again retire during the night.

Map supplied by Alexander Mikaberidze

On the 4^th February Napoleon crosses the Alle in pursuit of his elusive enemy, but the Polish winter begins to bite even harder, with heavy falls of snow and a high wind slowing down his forward movement. As Petre states:

At daybreak on the 4^th, the Emperor moved forward, Murat in front of the centre, Ney on the right of Jonkowo, Augereau on the left, Soult, from Bergfried, towards Mondtken. It soon appeared that Benningsen, aware not only of Soult’s presence at Bergfried, but also of the capture of Guttstadt by Guyot on the previous evening, had retreated during the night, leaving only a strong rearguard to waste Napoleon’s time in inducing him to deploy for battle. The course which he followed, in retreating northwards, was Bennigsen’s only chance of assuring his communications with Koenigsberg, which were seriously compromised by the loss of Bergfried, and Davout’s advance on Guttstadt.[1]

All of this constant manoeuvring by tens of thousands of men and horses must have resulted in a serious depletion of food and fodder for all three belligerents. Indeed, Thiers, whom I have reason to discount in regard to much of his propagandist writings when dealing with Napoleon’s campaigns, does state that:

On this same day, the 4^th of February, the Russians halted for a moment at Wolfsdorf, at an equal distance from the Alle and the Passarge, to take some rest, and to see whether the Prussian corps of General Lestocq, which was behind, would find means to rejoin them. But that corps was still so far off that they could not wait for it, and pressed by the French, they continued their march, abandoning Guttstadt, the resources which they had collected there, the wounded, the sick, and 500 men, who were made prisoners.

Though the magazines of Guttstadt were not very considerable, they were valuable to the French, who, outstripping their convoys, had no means of subsistence but what they procured for themselves by the way.[2]

Here we must pause for a moment to look at Napoleon’s administrative system during the campaigns of 1806 – 1807.

During the Revolutionary Wars the French army transport was all civilian.  The artillery and convoy trains, together with Waggoner’s, or, as the army called them, “Four – Wheel Hussars”[3] were all non-combatants. When Napoleon became Emperor in 1804 the Breidt Company became responsible for the supply of wagons, horses and drivers to the army. By bringing together the entire administrative arm of the service under one contactor, Napoleon hoped to avoid the mass corruption and greed that had plagued the army in the past. However, the Breidt Company proved to be just as susceptible to racketeering and underhanded dealings as all the rest, and the almost total breakdown in the supply of food and fodder during the Polish campaign coursed Bonaparte to eventually place all of the army’s administration under army control. But the problems involved in supplying and caring for the horses in all three armies during the Polish Campaign should be looked at in some depth.

The French, Russian and Prussian artillery, combined, numbered well over 700 guns. These, together with their limbers and caissons, would require between 5,000 – 6,000 horses in normal circumstances.  There are also the wagon trains, field forges and ambulances to consider, although the latter may not have amounted to very many in the Russian army. The Russians also travelled with a mass of small one/two horse carts, several hundred strong. One presumes that these were either used by the Cossacks to carry away their plunder, or maybe just as auxiliary transports for food and fodder? Taking all the above into account, plus the horses required for the cavalry and staffs of each army, then we arrive at the staggering total of around 80 – 100,000 horses, all of which need feeding and watering daily.

Engraving of Cossack cart (Dave Leonard)

Paul Dawson, in his paper, Artillery Train of the Guard: 1800 – 1815, [4]gives us a vivid account of what conditions could be like for the army’s beasts of burden:

Horses, like the soldiers who depended upon them, were also subject to the rigors of disease, poor rations, and the too – often squalid living conditions of an army camp. The death toll has never been calculated, but the cost of the War in horseflesh was surely enormous. Horses were required to pull the enormous weight of the cannon and ammunition; on average, each horse pulled about 700 pounds. Each gun in a battery used two six – horse teams; one team pulled a limber that towed the gun, the other pulled a limber that towed a caisson. The large number of horses posed a logistical challenge for the artillery, because they had to be fed, maintained, and replaced when worn out or injured. Artillery horses were generally selected second from the pool of high quality animals; the cavalry mounts were the best horses. The life expectancy of an artillery horse was under eight months. They suffered from disease, exhaustion from long marches (typically 16 miles in 10 hours), and battle injuries. The capacity of a healthy horse to pull a load was affected by a number of factors. Chief among these was the nature of the surface over which the load was being hauled. A single horse could pull 3,000 pounds 20 to 23 miles a day over a hard – paved road. Gassendi[5] noted that on a road a convoy of artillery could cover 0.94 miles in roughly an hour, and that a horse carrying 75.6 kg and drawing 315 kg could travel on average 20 miles a day. The weight dropped to 1,900 pounds over a compacted earthen road, and went down to 1,100 pounds over rough ground. The pulling ability was further reduced by one – half if a horse carried a rider on its back. Finally, as the number of horses in a team increased, the pulling capacity of each horse was further reduced. A horse in a team of six had only seven – ninths the pulling capacity it would have in a team of two. The goal was that each horse’s share of the load should be no more than 700 pounds. This was less than what a healthy horse, even carrying a rider and hitched into a team of six, could pull, but it furnished a safety factor that allowed for fatigue and losses.

Having consulted various veterinarians and cavalry experts, I herewith give a brief list of some of the ailments to which horses are prone.

1. Bruised Soles: The area on the sole of the hoof especially the toe callus, around the white line, or even on the hoof wall and around the coronet band. This can occur when removing a horse shoe.
2. Horse Thrush: Fungal infection around the frogs and heel bulb, which can attack the tissue at the back of the hoof. Correct feeding is very important.
3. Mud Fever/Cracked Heel: Occurs mainly in winter and early spring. Affects the lower leg and causes lameness.
4. Laminitis: Inflammation of the lamina in the horses hoof (front hooves more commonly affected) so that it is unable to bear any weight on its feet. This can be life threatening.
5. Ringworm: Fungal infection of the skin that can spread by direct or indirect contact. Strict hygiene is essential.
6. Rain Scald: Caused by a softening of the skin following prolonged exposure to saturation from rain and snow.
7. Common Cold: Horses that are kept in close proximity with other horses from different areas of the country.
8. Colic: Abdominal pain, possibly gut or other organ within the abdomen. Caused by a number of factors including bad diet.
9. Saddle Sores: Chaffing caused by ill – fitting or incorrectly adjusted saddles and fittings.
10. Collar Chaffing: Caused by wet or split leather horse collars worn over a long period.

Under the conditions that prevailed prior to, and during the course of the Battle of Eylau, I consider that, with the roads frozen solid, and thick snow covering the whole landscape, not only the artillery horses, but also the cavalry mounts, would have been in a deplorable condition. The tiring effect of labouring over ice and snow seem to give added weight to my theory that not all was as it appears concerning the traditionally accepted versions of the battle.

We may be sure that Napoleon gave much thought to the provisioning of his forces during the campaign, and I herewith give a detailed account of the preparations undertaken before the opening of the Polish campaign taken from Colonel H.C.B.Rogers, Napoleon’s Army:

Napoleon imposed an enormous war contribution on Prussia after his victories of 1806. Most of it he could not hope to realise in cash, but he levied supplies and charged their costs against the money he was owed. He paid for manufactured articles in the same way; e.g. uniforms made at Hamburg, Magdeburg, Leipzig, and Berlin; saddles made in Berlin and other places; and boots made at a number of German towns.

Napoleon regarded boots as particularly important, and he issued a written order in 1806 that, ‘Every detachment coming from Paris and Boulogne should start with each man having two pairs of shoes in his knapsack, besides those he is wearing. At Mayence they will receive another pair to replace the shoes worn on the march. At Magdeburg they will receive a new pair to replace those worn on the march from Mayence to Magdeburg; so every man should reach his unit with a pair of shoes on his feet and a pair in his knapsack.’ Yet in spite of these detailed orders, soldiers were frequently in distress for lack of a pair of serviceable shoes. The shocking Polish roads were probably largely responsible.

The Polish campaign is of particular interest in showing how Napoleon planned his supply in a country lacking resources. Davout’s corps was due to reach Posen on 9^th November 1806. Napoleon had selected this neighbourhood for his concentration area, and he ordered Davout to construct enormous bakeries to feed the whole army. In addition, supplies of all kinds were directed to Posen. Pushing on ahead, Davout captured the small fort of Linceya on 24^th November. Linceya was about 70 miles due west of Warsaw and surrounded by marches. There a great advanced magazine was established with immense quantities of stores and ammunition.

By January 1807 the six French army corps were deployed over a line 150 miles long, varying from about 10 to 100 miles east of the Vistula. A supply depot was established for each corps, and all but one of these were near or behind the Vistula. They were at Marienwerder for Bernadotte, at Thorn for Ney, at Plock for Soult, at Wyszogrod and Lowicz for Augereau, at Pultusk for Davout, and Warsaw for Lannes.That there might be no obstacle to the evacuation of that country should His Majesty see fit to order it.’ Ney, Bernadotte, and Soult, whose corps were farthest from the Vistula, were allowed to have small intermediate depots. Each corps, except Bernadotte’s, was given a concentration point in case their siting complied as far as possible with Napoleon’s wish, ‘not to have any encumbrances on the right bank of the Vistula, so the enemy should take the offensive. At each of these depots every sort of supply was collected and workshops were established for the repair of ordnance, clothes, and horse harness. Bakeries produced not only bread for current consumption, but also large quantities of biscuits as a ration reserve.[6]

As we can see from the above, all of this gathering, baking and repairing seemed to cover most situations; however, it was not a question of having food and fodder stockpiled that created the problem, it was its distribution that was seriously at fault.

Much of the French logistical planning was based on self –sufficiency, which, in turn, had become one of the basic components of their military success. The Revolutionary armies of France broke away from the old eighteenth century methods of supply, which had used vast slow moving convoys of wagons, the speed of which had dictated the pace of troop movements. The Prussian army, for example, just prior to the Battle of Valmy (20^th September 1792), would pause their march until six days’ rations of bread had been baked and then loaded onto their wagon train. They would then commence marching again until the wagons were empty, stopping once again to bake more bread.[7] The French had done away with all of this, and had adopted a policy of living off the land, using their own initiative in foraging for food and fodder, which, in turn, lead to the wide – scale plundering of the area passed through by their armies. In Poland, with its sparsely populated countryside and scattered villages, the problems of supply became acute. As Napoleon himself had to admit, on the 2^nd February 1807 when he wrote to Comte Pierre Antoine Drau, later to become the Intendant General of the Grand Army, ‘Circumstances have forced me to return to the system of depots.’[8] This depot system was not only to prove totally inadequate in supplying the needs of the army, but also subject to the same difficulties that plagued everything else during the Polish campaign, namely the deplorable state of the roads and terrible weather conditions. These facts, probably above all else, make the excepted descriptions of the Battle of Eylau, and in particular Murat’s great cavalry charge, not only highly unlikely but totally different from what we have come to take for granted. *