The Battle.

Rantzau’s Hanoverian troopers soon came up against the French advance guard under General Duc de Biron, who commanded a mixed force of 20 squadrons and 7 battalions of Swiss, and was marching on the village of Heurne. Taken aback by the presense of Allied cavalry already on the same side of the river as himself, Biron’s 20 squadrons soon checked Rantzau’s advance, and then Biron himself dismounted and climbed the church tower of Eyne in order to assess the situation. Instead of just a few Allied squadrons that he thought may have been sent on ahead on a reconnaissance mission, Biron was shocked and alarmed at the sight that met his gaze. Before him lay the enemy’s pontoon bridges with battalions and squadrons already over, while pouring down the shallow hillside on the other side of the river from the direction of Eename, cloaked in clouds of dust, marched a seemingly endless column of infantry and cavalry- the whole Allied army was heading in his direction. Acting with promptness, Biron sent messengers galloping back to inform Vendôme and Burgundy of the situation. Upon receiving Biron’s report Vendôme was flabbergasted, stating: ‘If they are there, then the devil must have carried them. Such marching is impossible.’¹ However Vendôme was no slouch, although he still only considered the Allied movement as a ploy, he immediately sent back orders to Biron telling him to attack at once, while the Marshal himself brought forward troops in support.

Just when Vendôme realised that he actually had the whole Allied army to deal with has been a matter of conjecture. Churchill says that the Marshal and his personal secretary, Alberoni, gave the hour as 10 a.m., and that the attack should begin at once. It was Burgundy who delayed any action until four in the afternoon, by which time Vendôme deemed it too late. Churchill goes on to say that it must have been at least 2 p.m. when Vendôme at last understood what was happening, and that his orders to Biron arrived at about 1.30 p.m., by that time Marlborough and Eugene were over the river and the Duke was already positioning a six gun battery on Cadogan’s left to the rear of the village of Schaerken.² Whatever hour Vendôme’s orders reached Biron things had altered dramatically, and the French advance guard commander was seriously outnumbered.

Positions of opposing armies in early afternoon.¹⁸

On the Allied side more German and British battalions under the Duke of Argyll were about to cross over the pontoons, while, and at 3 p.m., Cadogan’s battalions, with bundles of fascines prepared before hand, had placed them across the Diepenbeck and began to drive back the Swiss skirmish line on their supporting battalions around Eyne. At the same time Rantzau’s Hanoverian dragoons crossed over the stream outflanking the Swiss right flank. In the meantime Vendôme had sent a message to Burgundy, instructing him to move forward with the whole of the infantry and cavalry of the French left wing to capture the Allied bridgehead. This plan was indeed the correct way to proceed. With most of the Allied army still strung out on the march, the superiority of French numbers would have had a telling effect on the small forces of Cadogan and Rantzau.

It was at this stage of the battle that a peculiar incident occurred, which, even allowing for what transpired later on, was to have a decisive impact on Vendôme’s demeanour during the fighting, and indeed on the whole outcome of the battle itself.

Just as General Biron was about to move his three reserve Swiss battalions forward from around the village of Heurne, in support of his other four battalions at Eyne, Lieutenant- General Marquis de Puységur (Vendôme’s chief-of-staff), who had ridden forward to set out the French camp, informed Biron that the ground to his front was not suitable for cavalry owing to its soft and marshy nature. At the same time Marshal Matignon, who had also ridden up, added his two pence worth of topographical knowledge concerning the unsuitability of the ground. Just where these two men obtained their information is a mystery. Considering that several thousand French cavalry had been milling around the area when Oudenarde had been invested earlier in July, one would have thought that any areas that were not suitable for mounted troops would have been noted. Also it would appear that no one seems to have collected any information from local peasants or farmers concerning the state of the ground. With Rantzau’s eight Allied squadrons massed in front of them, how did they suppose that the ground was not passable to the French yet passable for the Allies? As if this was not bad enough, when Vendôme galloped up to find out why Biron was not carrying out his orders, he was also informed by Puységur that a morass covered the area between them and the enemy. The Marshal accepted this, but with decidedly bad grace, and turned his reinforcements to the west of the Ghent road, thus abandoning Biron to his fate.³ Just why Vendôme, or for that matter Biron himself, did not send a few mounted detachments forward to examine the ground is totally baffling. Even if there was boggy ground to Biron’s front, this would still mean that the Allies could not use their cavalry to any effect on his flank, and by swinging their massive superiority at this time in both infantry and cavalry around to the right, while bolstering Biron’s line with artillery and infantry, the French could have crushed any opposition already on their side of the river and captured the bridgehead.

While Vendôme was being persuaded that no offensive was possible on Biron’s front, Burgundy had arrived at the heights of Huyshe, to the north of the Norken River, with the main body of the French army. Although a sound position from which to offer a defensive battle, the heights of Huyshe was not the place to pause when it was evident that the Allies were approaching in strength. By throwing the whole weight of their army at the Allied bridgehead they would, to all intent and purpose, have gained the initiative, and if not crushed the Allied army as it came forward piecemeal, then at least caused it to retire somewhat ignominiously back the way it had come. It was now 2.45 p.m., and with only a few precious hours remaining before the onset of evening, poor general Biron was left very much to his own devices.⁴

William, First Earl of Cadogan

Sir Winston Churchill tells us that no record exists of any orders being sent to Cadogan, and he concludes that despite this that general “acted in the very closest concert with his chief.”⁵ To this end, at 3 p.m., as noted above, Cadogan’s 16 battalions moved forward to attack the village of Eyne.

Cadogan’s assault completely overwhelmed the Swiss battalions, who, feeling isolated, gave way without any show of their usual grit and stubbornness. Of the seven battalions under Biron’s command, three of the four posted at Eyne surrendered without a fight, while the other fell back to join their comrades who were advancing from Heurne. Here they were hit by Rantzau’s squadrons coming in on their left flank and were either killed, captured or dispersed.⁶ Rantzau’s cavalry, the future king George II amongst them, now began rampaging along the line of the Ghent road where they smashed into the compact squadrons of the Royal la Bretache Régiment, pushing them back in great disorder to the Norken river. Here, as more French cavalry now began to come forward, and being fired upon by a battery of artillery near Mullem, Rantzau pulled his troopers back in reasonably good order to join Cadogan’s battalions around Heurne village, bringing back with them ten captured standards and two kettledrums.

General engagement at about late afternoon¹⁸

Cadogan’s attack and Rantzau’s cavalry charge had brought Marlborough precious time, and now at around 5 p.m., with more Allied reinforcements crossing over to bolster his battlefront, he directed Cadogan to move his infantry to the west along the Marollebeek, while General Natzemer’s 20 Prussian squadrons came forward to join Ranzau’s cavalry protecting the right flank. On Cadogan’s left, Argyle extended the line with his 20 battalions towards the village of Schaerken.

As these Allied movements were being implemented, Burgundy sent General Grimaldi, with 16 squadrons of cavalry, orders to cross over the Norken River as a prelude to a general forward movement by the French centre and right wing. Once again, and with no real sound reconnoitring of the ground, Grimaldi informed Burgundy that the area was not suitable, and without getting a second opinion on the “actual” state of the ground, which had we must not forget been passed over, in part, by Rantzau’s troopers, Burgundy agreed to allow Grimaldi to fall back to Roijgem, where the young Prince had himself set up his headquarters near a windmill. It was from here, at 4.30 p.m., that Burgundy also ordered six battalions of infantry to attack Groenewald, which was successfully repulsed by the Prussians holding the village. The sound of this engagement brought Vendôme onto the scene at the head of 12 fresh battalions, ‘…but did not see fit to pause at Roijgem mill to concert any plan of action with Burgundy. Instead he rallied the two brigades repulsed from Groenewald, led them forward again with his own force in a new series of attacks against the Allies behind the Marollebeek between Herlegem and Groenewald. Cadogan and the Prussians withstood the pressure, and Vendôme ordered up more and more infantry from the French right until 50 battalions were engaged’. ⁷

Despite fighting from behind the fences and hedges surrounding Groenewald, and having been reinforced by their two battalions bought up from the pontoons, Cadogan’s Prussians were finally forced out of the village just after 5 p.m. by unrelenting French attacks. But even as they fell back the Duke of Argyll came into line with his twenty battalions of Hanoverian, Hessian and British infantry on Vendôme’s right flank, threatening him with envelopment. This proved too much for Vendôme, and throwing restraint to the wind he plunged into the thick of the fighting with a Half-pike in his hand, orderings still more battalions forward in dense masses.⁸

John Campbell, 2^nd Duke of Argyle

These massive French assaults, if properly coordinated and sustained by a concerted attack by Burgundy, who still had over 30,000 men at hand, would without doubt have overwhelmed the Allied position, but with Vendôme fighting in the ranks, and Burgundy surrounded by sycophants and armchair topographers, it is small wonder that every opportunity that presented itself to the French was squandered. As Churchill states:

We must regard the paralysis of the French left wing at this moment as most fortunate for the Allies. No one can pretend to measure what would have happened had Cadogan been driven, as he surely would have been, back upon Eyne by the concerted onslaught of overwhelming numbers. But ill-luck does not exculpate Vendôme. He should not have indulged himself by entering the local fighting around Groenewald unless he could keep a sense of proportion and a comprehensive grip of his great army. Half an hour later it was apparent that the left wing was still motionless; but by that time he was fighting with a pike, like a private soldier rather than a marshal of France and charged with the supreme control of ninety thousand men.⁹

Indeed, possibly one of Vendôme’s last orders (suggestions?) to Burgundy, before he threw himself into the fray, was to advance over the Norken with the French left wing and crush Natzemer and Rantzau’s squadrons and then turn to roll up the Allied line. The fact that this was never attempted was again due to the interference of the “ground expert” Puységur, who informed Burgundy that the banks of the Norken River were too marshy to support the passage of cavalry. Once again Burgundy accepted this without endeavouring to send out any cavalry to test the ground, and once again a great opportunity was lost.

George Hamilton, 1^st Earl of Orkney

Nevertheless, at 5.30 p.m. French pressure was again beginning to tell on the Allied position as their 50 battalions slowly gained ground over Marlborough’s 36 battalions. Luck and good marching now once again turned in favour of the Allies, as General Lottum arrived on the field with 20 foot -sore but eager battalions to bolster the line. This fresh injection of manpower was immediately used to extend the line from Schaerken village along the southern bank of the Diepenbeek stream, countering in the nick of time the French advance in that area. Now, at around 6.00 p.m., Marlborough gave Prince Eugene command of the Allied right wing, while he rode to the right to take charge of the fighting along the Diepenbeek. He was also now comforted by the news that 18 Hanoverian, a Hessian and Saxon battalions were following in Lottum’s wake, and that General Lumley with his cavalry had passed through Oudenarde, however the Dutch and Danish wing of the Allied army under General Overkirk had been detained by a breakdown of one of the bridges in the town.¹⁰

As the Hanoverian, Hessian and Saxon troops arrived on the field Marlborough slotted them neatly into line with Lottum’s battalions on the left and, with the skill he had used at the battle of Ramilles in 1706, slowly pulled Lottum’s troops from the firing line, leaving their regimental standards in place to deceive the French. Once clear of the front Lottum’s soldiers formed in column of march and, after refilling their cartridge pouches moved to the right where they came into line to give support to Cadogan’s hard pressed battalions around Groenewald and Herlegem. This manoeuvre proved most fortuitous as by 6.30 p.m. both villages were held by the French and the Allied line here was beginning to crack. With the arrival of Lottum the situation was stabilised and Groenewald retaken, but only after a ferocious hand-to-hand battle in which the French gave ground slowly.¹¹

At sometime during the afternoon Marlborough had received intelligence reports from his scouts that the Boser Couter Hill, which overlooked the battlefield from the west, was clear of any enemy troops. Turning to General Overkirk, who had ridden on ahead of his Dutch and Danish contingent the Duke instructed him to take his strong corps of 24 battalions and 12 squadrons and move past the village of Oycke and thence onto the Boser Couter to turn the French right flank. The Duke fully expected that this manoeuvre would be carried out at around 6.00 p.m., but due to the problems involved repairing the broken bridge in Oudenarde, and the subsequent bottleneck created by the pile up of troops, it was not until about 7.00 p.m. that Overkirk finally managed to get his forces onto the hill.¹²

Meanwhile the French were still throwing in repeated attacks and Marlborough was forced to send an urgent message to Overkirk asking him to send help to the outnumbered Allied infantry holding the chateau of Brouwaan on the extreme left of the line. As with all of his battles Marlborough was well served by his subordinate officers. Overkirk responded immediately, detaching Major-General Week with eight Dutch battalions who moved off their original line of march towards Brouwaan. Here they burst upon the exposed French right, causing it to form a refused flank to meet the unexpected threat of envelopment.

Looking from the Boser Couter towards the Heights of Huysse in the middle distance.

At just after 7.00 p.m., and while Overkirk’s corps was moving towards the Boser Couter, General Lumley had received orders from the Duke to take his 17 squadrons of British cavalry from a holding position near Bevere and proceed to the right flank to bolster the line. Prince Eugene, always ready to follow orders, or use his own initiative, now reinforced by Lumley’s troopers, sent Natzemer’s Prussian squadrons in a spoiling and time gaining attack on French left flank around Herlegem.

The charge of Natzemer’s Prussians across the Ghent road shows how wrong Burgundy was to follow the advice of the “not suitable for cavalry” clan: ‘…the rapid progress of these horsemen demonstrated Puységur’s complete error in warning against an advance by French cavalry over pretty well the same ground earlier in the day.’¹³

General Natzemer

Natzemer’s squadrons ploughed into the French line of cavalry protecting the left of Herlegem, then swinging right, routed two battalions of infantry and cut down and dispersed the crews of an artillery battery. But by now Natzemer had lost control over his troopers and the attack carried too far, coming up against the immaculate and well ordered ranks of the French Maison du Roi cavalry who had moved forward from Royegem:

Natzemer, left quite alone in the midst of the enemy, received four sabre-cuts, and escaped only by leaping a broad ditch, “full of water in which a dead horse was lying.” Survivors of the twenty squadrons found refuge behind the ranks of Cadogan’s and Lottum’s battalions. Three quarters of the gendarmes (Prussians) perished. The twenty squadrons existed no more as a fighting force; but precious time had been gained.¹⁴

The sacrifice of Natzemer’s squadrons had not only brought precious time for Cadogan, Lottum and Argyle, but had also diverted French attention away from the growing threat to their right flank, which was about to be fallen upon like a thunder clap.

Final positions at about 8:00 pm¹⁸

At 8.00 p.m. Overkirk was finally in position on the Boser Couter, with the yawning void of the French right flank and rear before him. With the rest of the Allied line now redoubling their efforts to contain the struggling French masses on their front, Overkirk now sent Count Tilly with twelve squadrons of Danish cavalry thundering down on the enemy open flank, while at the same time the Prince of Orange and Count Oxenstiern led forward sixteen Dutch infantry battalions between the château of Brouwaan and the village of Schaerken.¹⁵

Site of the Château of Brouwaan

The surprise was complete, and the French fighting line began to disintegrate. Even the bold, if slightly ruffled Masion du Roi could do nothing to redress the situation on the right flank and centre, which was now almost surrounded, while over on the left Cadogan was pressing his attack from Groenewald, ‘ The straight line had become a vast horseshoe of flame within which, in a state of ever-increasing confusion, were more than fifty thousand Frenchmen. It was now half-past eight. But for the failure of the bridges in Oudenarde this situation might have been reached an hour earlier.’¹⁶ By 9.00 p.m., in the gathering darkness, Marlborough ordered a halt, and the rounding up of French prisoners began.

Despite the lateness of the hour Marlborough’s bold battle plan, albeit with the aid of the incompetence shown by the French high command, had been successfully completed. From his viewpoint at the Royegem mill, Burgundy had seen the Danish and Dutch pressing forward in his direction and thereupon decided it was prudent to leave the field, and amid much clattering of plate and clinking of bottles, the servants packed away the food and wine which had been spread around the royal headquarters; while Burgundy and his cronies made haste to put distance between themselves and the victorious Allies.

Vendôme, covered in sweat and dirt, his face blackened with powder, had managed to extricate himself from the general chaos, and caught up with Burgundy and his entourage at around 10.00 p.m., as they were making their way back on the Ghent road. The gruff old Marshal, furious with the whole conduct of the battle, demanded to know what was to be done to try and redress the situation. Burgundy began to explain, or attempt to explain, his actions, but Vendôme cut him short, “Your Royal Highness must remember that you only came to this army upon condition that you obeyed me,” and he went on to say that he failed to understand how the young Duke had managed to remain inactive with 30,000 fresh troops, while the rest of the French army had been fighting for their lives under his very nose. Whether through arrogance or ignorance, Burgundy allowed the Marshal’s comments to pass, and soon Vendôme cooled down. He now proposed to renew the struggle the next day, using the intact French Left wing, and what elements of the rest of the army he could pull together. However, Burgundy remained adamant that the French were short of ammunition, and in no fit condition to become embroiled in another major battle. Once again Puységur and Matignon concurred with this view, and this time they were in all probability correct, when one considers the state of the morale of men who have been engaged in a defeat and witnessed one. Realising that he had no chance of persuading any of the other high command to support his views, Vendôme reluctantly ordered the retreat to continue, and turning to Burgundy he snarled: ‘And you, Monsieur, have long had that wish.’¹⁷

The battle had cost the French some 5,500 in killed and wounded, and another 9,000 prisoners, which included 800 officers, together with 106 regimental colours and standards. Ten pairs of kettledrums and over 4,000 horses and mules were also taken. The Allied losses amounted to 2,972 killed and wounded.

The French army never recovered during the remainder of 1708 from the battering that it had taken at Oudenarde. Fully realising this fact Marlborough conceived a plan by which he proposed to bypass the great fortresses of the French frontier and march directly onto Paris. This would cause the garrisons of the frontier fortresses to come out in pursuit, while at the same time Vendôme would also have to follow the Allies, allowing Marlborough to bring on a great battle and finally end the war. Unfortunately Prince Eugene was opposed to the plan, one of the few times he disagreed with Marlborough’s strategy. For his part therefore the Duke was forced to fall back upon a lesser plan, entailing the siege of enemy fortresses. Although this would, if successful, have great strategic importance, it would not end the war.¹⁸

Graham J.Morris August 2008